Vol. 27, No. 4 by Shannon, Ryan
Chicago-Kent College of Law 
Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law 
The Illinois Public Employee Relations Report Institute for Law and the Workplace 
Fall 2010 
Vol. 27, No. 4 
Ryan Shannon 
Dickinson Wright, PLLC 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/iperr 
 Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Shannon, Ryan, "Vol. 27, No. 4" (2010). The Illinois Public Employee Relations Report. 44. 
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/iperr/44 
This Book is brought to you for free and open access by the Institute for Law and the Workplace at Scholarly 
Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in The Illinois Public Employee 
Relations Report by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. For 
more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
1
Fall  2010IPER REPORT
INSIDE
Recent Developments   . . . . .  . 09
Illinois Public Employee Relations 
REPORT
Fall 2010 • Volume 27, Number 4
By Ryan Shannon
Public Sector Furloughs: Player Perspectives, Strategies, and Grounds for 
Challenge
I. Introduction
Furloughs are on the rise at a time when 
tough economic conditions are driving 
up the demand for state services.1 Long-
used to close budget gaps in economic 
downturns, furloughs were widespread 
in the early 1990s, but public employers 
have used them at greater rates in the 
latest recession than at any time since 
World War II.2 A furlough is a period of 
non-work. The term can be further 
qualified to mean a period of non-work, 
generally no longer than two or three 
days at a time, from which the employee 
is guaranteed to return.3   Furloughs can 
be voluntary or mandatory; paid or 
unpaid; and applied uniformly or 
imposed unevenly on employees based 
on take-home pay. This flexibility is 
attractive to employers trying to stop 
the bleeding in times of rapid down-
turn.4 Since the global economic collapse 
began in 2007, at least 24 states have 
adopted some type of furloughs to meet 
their budgetary shortfalls.5 These in-
clude: California, where upwards of 
189,000 executive branch employees 
have been furloughed for three days 
each month; Maryland, where 70,000 
government services employees will be 
furloughed for 20 days over the next two 
years; and Hawaii, where public school 
teachers  agreed to 17 annual furlough 
days.6 Even with improved economic
indicators, states face an estimated 
$110 billion budget gap in the next two 
fiscal cycles.7  Furloughs are likely to be 
even more widespread as states move 
through the two years following the 
recession, which are typically "states' 
toughest budget years."8
This article explores the social and 
legal consequences of furloughs in the 
public sector. Part II analyzes the 
perspectives of the various players, 
including unions, employees, employ-
ers, and members of the public. Part III 
surveys the law governing authority to 
declare furloughs at various levels of 
government. Part IV summarizes the 
constitutional basis under which unions 
and employees have challenged fur-
loughs.
II. Player Perspectives 
A. Unions and Members
Unions walk a fine line in deciding 
whether to support or oppose furloughs. 
For unions, temporary and short-term 
furloughs are preferable to layoffs 
because union members keep their jobs 
and remain members. Furloughs also 
keep current contracts in place with 
only temporary salary reductions. When 
the economy improves, unions that have 
accepted furlough days will not have to 
bargain back concessions they might 
have otherwise made. Opposing fur-
loughs can be risky since employers 
with time-sensitive budgetary needs 
may feel it easier to simply issue layoffs, 
which are not likely to have legal 
complications.9
 Some unions have used the 
furlough as another bargaining chip
at the table.10   For example, in 
Connecticut, unions agreed to take 
seven unpaid furlough days over 
two years in exchange for a promise 
that the state would not lay off any 
employees until at least 2012.11 
Public sector unions in Massachu-
setts and New Jersey exacted a 
similar promise in exchange for 
wage freezes and unpaid furlough 
days.12
Unions recognize that furloughs are 
preferable to layoffs for employers for a 
number of reasons, the most salient 
being the political price employers pay 
in carrying out layoffs and reducing 
services permanently. Furloughs do 
have political consequences as well. 
Unions can barter not only over whether 
furloughs will be enacted, but also how 
they will be enacted; a union might 
concede, for example, to an employer's 
decision to order a complete office shut-
down, where all employees stay home on 
the same day and the public is unable to 
make use of government services, and 
threaten to oppose rolling furloughs 
(where the public is less visibly affected) 
to exact a greater price at the bargaining 
table.13
For individual employees, fur-
loughs can have substantial benefits 
over layoffs. Even where the wages lost 
during furloughs are not later reim-
bursed,14 employees may prefer to have 
the option of volunteering for long 
weekends or extending their vacations 
with a few days of unpaid leave.15 In 
periods of economic decline, a steady 
source of even a reduced income is often 
preferable to standing in unemployment 
lines and searching for new employ-
00472_IPER _Page 1 _ 12/8/2010 _ 12:32 PM
 IPER REPORT Fall  2010
2
Ryan Shannon graduated with honors 
from the University of Michigan Law 
School in 2010. He is employed by 
Dickinson Wright, PLLC, in Lansing, 
Michigan. Prior to graduation, Mr. 
Shannon worked as a law clerk with the 
Michigan House of Representatives and 
the Michigan Department of Environ-
mental Quality. He has served as a 
contributing editor to the Michigan 
Journal of Law Reform.
ment. Individual employees are increas-
ingly living paycheck to paycheck, 
however, and even a slight reduction 
or delay in weekly pay can cause 
hardship.16  When Hawaii Governor 
Linda Lingle's proposed three-day per 
month furloughs for state executive 
branch employees were struck down as a 
violation of the state's constitution in 
2009, the judge expressed concern that 
"[t]he nature of a 13 to 15 percent cut in 
these wages sets in motion changes of 
jobs, failure of workers to make rents, 
mortgages, failure . . . to pay tuitions, to 
pay their loans, creating bad credit 
ratings, and cascading effects from these 
events."17  The Fourth Circuit Court of 
Appeals expressed a similar concern in 
invalidating the City of Baltimore's 
furloughs in 1993, noting an annual 
salary reduction of $240 dollars "could 
represent a substantial portion of a 
monthly mortgage or rental payment, or 
weeks of food."18
B. Employers and the Public
Furloughs have structural and insti-
tutional advantages for public employ-
ers. By furloughing employees rather 
than terminating them, public employ-
ers are better able to maintain morale 
and institutional expertise. Furloughs 
have the benefit of speed and flexibility 
– features which can be essential when 
economic calamity takes public officials 
by surprise.19   Moreover, as discussed 
above, furloughs can be more politically 
expedient than layoffs. Unions are often
represented on both sides of the table, 
and public employers may prefer to use 
furlough days where the union pushes 
for them in lieu of layoffs.20 Additionally, 
a temporary shutdown can save on 
infrastructure costs including heating 
and energy.21
But not all costs are avoided. 
Employees with collective bargaining 
agreements continue to collect health 
and retirement benefits while fur-
loughed.22 Where the contract permits, 
employers may seek additional savings 
by structuring furlough days so that 
employees drop below the minimum 
level of hours necessary to accrue health 
benefits,23  though such a decision is 
likely to raise the risk of legal challenge 
by unions. There is also evidence that 
furloughs, if structured improperly, are 
ineffective at preserving money in the 
public coffers.24 Following Governor 
Schwarzenegger's furloughing of state 
employees in February  2009, the 
Berkeley Center for Labor Research and 
Education released a study, finding that 
the savings were far less than claimed 
considering25  "lost state income taxes 
from state employees; reduced revenue 
collection; . . . and the funds needed to 
maintain retirement benefits:"26
Based on new data . . . on actual 
savings from the furloughs since 
February 2009, we estimate a 
reduction in wages and benefits of 
$2.01 billion for 193,000 workers 
over the course of the year. 
Accounting for the share   of fur-
loughs that impact workers who are 
not on the General Fund, lost 
revenue, and increased costs due to 
the furlough program, the net 
savings to the General Fund for FY 
09-10 is estimated to be just $738 
million. The FY 09-10 furloughs will 
further result in a loss of $503 
million over the subsequent years, 
leaving a net savings of $236 million 
to the general fund.27
The report concluded that, "for every 
dollar in reduced spending from fur-
loughs, the state saves . . . 12 cents when 
losses in subsequent years are taken 
into account."28 The report also indi-
cated that the furloughs would result in
"disruptions of state services [with] an
impact on the broader economy."29
An employer's ultimate decision to 
furlough rests on its ability to convince 
the public that the furlough is to their 
benefit. Closed offices result in delays in 
licensing and can interrupt important 
government projects or cause major 
inconveniences for members of the 
public. In the 1995-1996 federal govern-
ment shut down,30 for example, the 
Center for Disease Control lost several 
weeks of data regarding the spread of 
AIDS and the flu virus; seven million 
potential national parks patrons were 
forced to forego their visits; and 200,000 
U.S passport applications went unproc-
essed.31   In the most recent economic 
downturn, furloughs of state workers 
charged with processing Social Security 
payments have been especially wide-
spread.32  Even though funding for the 
program comes from the federal govern-
ment, state workers process claims, and 
furloughs extend an already long-term 
application process.33   Where cuts are 
especially deep, counties and munici-
palities find themselves in the undesir-
able position of slashing emergency 
response funding or reducing staff at 
facilities providing public safety,34 
which includes firefighters, police, staff 
at prisons and healthcare workers.35
III. Authority to Furlough
A. Executive/Gubernatorial 
Authority
The power to furlough, as differenti-
ated from the authority to close or 
combine executive agencies, is typically 
(and initially) based on the same implied 
or express constitutional powers to 
direct the dispensation of the state's 
budget that give rise to the ability to 
enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments. In entering a collective bargain-
ing agreement, a state or city executive 
is giving up part of its sovereignty and 
becomes like an ordinary individual; 
"instead of . . . a reservation of some
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sovereign right to withhold payment, the 
contract should be regarded as an 
assurance that such a right will not be 
exercised. A promise to pay, with a 
reserved right to deny or change the 
effect of the promise, is an absurdity."36 
But where there is no guarantee of 
wages or hours of employment in a 
collective bargaining agreement, a state 
or city executive acts within a constitu-
tional mandate when ordering fur-
loughs. In Colorado, for example, once 
the state's legislative apparatus "appro-
priates the funds, the Governor takes 
over to 'administer the appropriation to 
accomplish its purpose.'"37
In a 2009 opinion, the Colorado 
Attorney General argued that the 
Colorado Constitution "invests the 
Governor with discretion to take acts to 
defray the cost of government" and 
"allocate staff and resources."38  Within a 
separation of powers analysis, the 
authority to declare mandatory fur-
loughs was implied, and "consistent 
with the legislature's acknowledgement 
that the Governor, within his executive 
authority, can and should restrict the 
number of employees to the minimum 
necessary for efficient operation of the 
State."39
The governor's power to direct the 
dispensation of funding, or to rein it in 
through furloughs, is essential in light of 
the executive branch's general incapac-
ity to appropriate funding, even in 
periods of emergency.40  In Virginia, for 
example, the state's Emergency Ser-
vices and Disaster Law provides that 
the governor may declare a state of 
emergency "[w]henever, in the opinion 
of the Governor, the safety and welfare 
of the people of the Commonwealth 
require the exercise of emergency 
measures due to a threatened or actual 
disaster."41  Though the governor's 
emergency powers are broad, including 
to some extent an ability to waive state 
law (and enact furloughs),42  Virginia's 
Constitution explicitly states that "[n]o . 
. . appropriation of public or trust money 
or property . . . shall be passed except by
the affirmative vote of a majority of all 
members elected to each house. . . ."43 
The separation of powers doctrine limits 
the governor's emergency powers to the 
management of appropriated funds, 
making the implied power of furloughs 
all the more important when a govern-
ment shutdown looms for lack of new 
appropriations.44
Several states  explicitly  allow the 
governor to furlough employees or shut 
down services in the event of a state 
emergency – fiscal or otherwise. By 
statute, mandatory furloughs are ex-
pressly permitted in Colorado following 
the declaration of a fiscal emergency by 
that state's General Assembly.45  This 
authority differs from the more general 
constitutional authority used by Gover-
nor Ritter to declare furlough days in 
2009.46  During a budget negotiation 
crisis in 2006, New Jersey Governor 
John Corzine declared a state of 
emergency to invoke special powers 
granted to him under the New Jersey 
Disaster Control Act.47  By declaring an 
emergency, Corzine was able to "shut 
down non-essential government ser-
vices to avoid problems," in advance of 
the impending budgetary deadline.48 
Among the services Corzine designated 
"non-essential" were New Jersey's 
Casino Control Commission and Divi-
sion of Gaming Enforcement.49  The 
political pressure from the Casino 
shutdown influenced the legislature to 
act quickly in overcoming the negotia-
tion impasse, but caused significant 
damage to the industry and led many to 
criticize Corzine's invocation of emer-
gency powers as a political ploy and an 
abuse of authority.50
Even where state executives have 
the authority to declare furloughs, there 
is a secondary question as to the scope of 
their authority in selecting the manner 
of implementing those furloughs. The 
Civil Service Amendments to the 
Colorado Constitution provide only that 
classified employees "hold their respec-
tive positions during efficient service."51 
The Colorado Attorney General has
opined that these provisions do not 
prevent the governor from exempting 
certain departments or positions from a 
furlough plan, but instead merely 
require "equal pay for equal work."52 
Since "[e]mployees who are furloughed 
receive less pay, but . . . also work less," 
an exemption from furloughs for certain 
departments or worker classifications is 
ostensibly "in keeping with the equal 
pay for equal work requirement."53
At the municipal level, the issue 
presented is not always the authority to 
declare an unpaid furlough, but the 
authority as between city executives to 
direct which employees will be subject 
to that declaration. In Burnette v. 
Stroger, for example, the Cook County 
Public Defender squared off against the 
President of the Cook County Board 
when the president selected specific 
employees in the defender's office to be 
furloughed.54 In Illinois, the Public 
Defender Act "provides the public 
defender with the right to 'appoint' 
attorneys to serve as assistant public 
defenders, who then 'serve at the 
pleasure of the Public Defender.'"55 The 
court differentiated between the county 
board's power "to fix the number and 
compensation of the assistant public 
defenders," and the public defender's 
right "within that fixed number, to hire 
and fire individuals to serve as assistant 
public defenders and staff members."56 
Though the board had an implied right 
to furlough employees generally, the 
Public Defender Act placed the author-
ity to implement the furlough squarely 
in the hands of the public defender.
Another potential constraint on 
executive authority to declare furloughs 
is the essential nature of the service. In 
Colorado, for example, there may be an 
implied authority by statute allowing 
the governor to suspend or discontinue 
certain services once it becomes appar-
ent that insufficient revenues are 
available to provide for those services.57 
An executive at the municipal level may 
be constrained by charter provisions 
describing particular governmental func-
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tions  as "mandatory," as is sometimes 
the case with certain duties of the city 
prosecutor's office.58 Unions have had 
little success, however, in arguing that 
public safety services are mandatory 
where not expressly deemed so. In 
Fiscal Court of Taylor County v. Taylor 
County Metro Police, furloughed police 
officers challenged Taylor County's 
ability to effectively terminate its police 
services by appropriating inadequate 
funds.59 The Kentucky Supreme Court 
determined that the county's decision 
was not subject to judicial review, 
describing the decision to fund and 
maintain a police force as "political."60 
Similar decisions have permitted mu-
nicipalities to cease the operation of the 
local jail,61  close a fire station even 
where the closing potentially endan-
gered residents,62 and abolish the 
Chicago's Transit Authority police 
force.63
B. Legislative and Judicial 
Furloughs
The separation of powers doctrine 
prevents state or city executives from 
directly furloughing the employees of 
other branches, though the legislature 
can still effectively force furloughs by 
reducing appropriations, with some 
exceptions. For the sake of parity with 
executive branch employees, legislative 
leaders have sometimes volunteered to 
take furloughs themselves and extended 
furloughs to all legislative branch 
employees.64 Many state constitutions 
explicitly prevent their legislative 
branches from altering the pay of state 
judges, but judicial furloughs can be a 
practical reality when funding reduc-
tions reach other judicial branch 
employees. In New Jersey, Article VI of 
the state constitution prohibits any 
reduction in judicial salaries during the 
term of appointment.65 In an attempt at 
achieving parity for all judicial branch 
employees after declaring mandatory 
furloughs for 8,500 administrative and 
clerical staff in 2005, Chief Justice
Stuart Rabner had success in asking for 
voluntary furloughs by state judges.66 
Most state judges agreed to take 
voluntary unpaid furloughs in an effort 
to share the fiscal pain and lost wages of 
their employees.67
At the federal level, some courts have 
been forced to implement furlough days 
and shorten hours in recent years.68 
When inadequate appropriations from 
Congress result in layoffs or furloughs, 
this "can erode the independence of the 
judiciary," and "[w]hile the Constitution 
attempts to provide some measure of 
protection for the judiciary by making 
clear that judges' salaries may not be 
reduced, there is no provision whatso-
ever for the funding of the infrastruc-
ture needed for efficient courts: the 
physical facilities, clerks, and staff."69  In 
the battle over budget and the provision 
of services, furloughs in the courts not 
only threaten the separation of powers, 
but provide an example of a significant 
effect on the efficiency of the judiciary.70
IV. Limitations on the 
Authority to Furlough 
A. Collective Bargaining
Agreements & Impairment of 
Contract Analysis
Unions find themselves in a precari-
ous position when opposing an 
employer's decision to furlough, since 
employers with time-sensitive budget 
issues may opt to implement permanent 
layoffs instead. In 2003, AFSCME 
argued that a proposed statewide one-
day furlough of State of Illinois 
employees violated the terms of their 
collective bargaining agreement, and 
sought an injunction and an order for 
arbitration.71 After the court granted the 
injunction, the employer "amended its 
furlough plan to provide for permanent 
layoffs in seven State agencies and 
began to implement the amended 
plan."72  The injunction was ultimately 
upheld as valid, but AFSCME was left to 
arbitrate the issue of the employer's
layoffs instead of furloughs.73
Though the issue has not been 
explicitly decided in any jurisdiction, at 
least one court has indicated that the 
impact of furloughs is subject to 
mandatory bargaining and a public 
employer commits an unfair labor 
practice when it refuses to bargain prior 
to implementation. In Commonwealth v. 
Board, Pennsylvania Labor Relations 
Bd., the Commonwealth Court of 
Pennsylvania reviewed an order of the 
Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board 
finding the employer had committed an 
unfair labor practice by refusing to 
bargain over the transfer of its employ-
ees out of the bargaining unit.74 The 
employer's plan included long-term 
furloughs with recall rights for employ-
ees once the economy improved; the 
court indicated that because the deci-
sion to furlough affected the "hours, 
wages, and terms and conditions of 
employment" of the workers, the impact 
of the decision fell outside of the 
managerial prerogative exception and 
the implementation of the furlough was 
a mandatory bargaining issue.75  Apply-
ing Pennsylvania's "balancing test of the 
various competing interests of the 
public employer and the public employ-
ees in order to determine whether a 
particular issue is subject to bargain-
ing," the court approved  the Board's 
determination that even where the 
employer decided to furlough employ-
ees for a legitimate reason such as the 
lack of funding, the employer's "furlough 
of . . . employees . . . [was] clearly [a] 
matter[] of fundamental concern to the 
employees' interest in wages, hours, and 
other terms and conditions of employ-
ment."76
Where a collective bargaining agree-
ment expressly guarantees a minimum 
level of wages or hours, a furlough would 
normally constitute a breach of the 
agreement. Where an agreement exists 
and the furlough is done pursuant to 
state law, unions can challenge the 
"unilateral "amend[ment] [of] collective 
bargaining agreements without further
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negotiations,"77 as a violation of the 
Contract Clause in the U.S. Constitu-
tion.78  A furlough enacted pursuant to 
state law is not a breach of contract, but 
the law itself may be an invalid 
impairment of the contract.79
The Contract Clause, "on its face . . . 
appears to be absolute," but "courts have 
held that the Contract Clause does not 
take precedence over the police power 
of the state to protect the general 
welfare of its citizens, a power which 'is 
paramount to any rights under contracts 
between individuals.'"80 In  U.S. Trust 
Co. of New York v. New Jersey, the 
Supreme Court indicated that the 
Contract Clause applies to both public 
contracts as well as private ones:
It long has been established that the 
Contract Clause limits the power of 
the States to modify their own 
contracts as well as to regulate those 
between private parties. . . . Yet, the 
Contract Clause does not prohibit 
the States from repealing or amend-
ing statutes generally, or from 
enacting legislation with retroactive 
effects.81
The Supreme Court instead set out to 
"reconcile the requirements of the 
Contract Clause with the essential 
attributes of sovereign power necessar-
ily reserved by the states to safeguard 
the welfare of their citizens."82 The 
Supreme Court's analysis in U.S. Trust 
requires a three-part inquiry to deter-
mine the constitutionality of impair-
ments for both private and public 
contracts.83  The court first assesses 
whether "the legislation at issue, in fact, 
impairs a contract."84  If the court finds 
an impairment, it must second "deter-
mine whether said impairment consti-
tutes a "substantial impairment of a 
contractual relationship."85  Finally, the 
court must determine whether the 
impairment is "reasonable and neces-
sary to serve an important public 
purpose."86
The application of the Contract 
Clause to public contracts differs in an 
important way, however, in that courts 
are not willing to grant the same level of 
deference to state legislatures when the
contracts are of their own making. In 
determining what is "reasonable and 
necessary," the U.S. Supreme Court 
noted:
[C]omplete deference to a legislative 
assessment of reasonableness and 
necessity is not appropriate because 
the State's self-interest is at stake. 
A governmental entity can always 
find a use for extra money, especially 
when taxes do not have to be raised. 
If a State could reduce its financial 
obligations whenever it wanted to 
spend the money for what it regarded 
as an important public purpose, the 
Contract Clause would provide no 
protection at all."87
The First Circuit has indicated that, 
though complete deference to a state's 
impairment of public contracts is 
inappropriate, "where economic or social 
legislation is at issue, some deference to 
the legislature's judgment is surely called 
for."88
1. The Development of the Contract 
Clause in Furlough Litigation
In 1992, the New York legislature 
passed a state finance law "which 
effect[ed] a five-day lag payroll upon 
both represented and unrepresented 
nonjudicial employees of the Unified 
Court System for the fiscal year."89 
Under the law, additional "savings 
[were] to be realized by paying employ-
ees for nine days, rather than 10, in each 
biweekly salary check over five payroll 
periods. The wages deferred [were] to be 
paid in lump sums when the employees' 
service [was] terminated, either by 
retirement or death."90 The employees' 
union sued, arguing the statute violated 
the Contract Clause.
The New York Court of Appeals had 
little trouble finding a substantial 
impairment of the collective bargaining 
agreement, noting that "withholding 10 
percent of an employee’s expected 
wages each week over a period of 10 
weeks . . . is not an insubstantial 
impairment to one confronted with 
monthly debt payments and daily 
expenses for food and other necessities
of life."91  In reaching the last step of the 
analysis – whether the legislation was 
"reasonable and necessary to accom-
plish the State's purposes" – the court 
indicated that while it would typically 
defer to the state's choice of "revenue-
raising or revenue-saving devices," the 
impairment was not on the "menu of 
alternatives."92 Because other alterna-
tives were available, the legislation was 
deemed unconstitutional, and the court 
upheld the enjoinment of the legislation's 
enforcement.93
In the New York litigation, the 
substantial impairment was a long-term 
delay in pay rather than an actual 
diminishment in compensation. It fol-
lows that mandatory unpaid furloughs, 
in which there is an actual reduction in 
compensation, should constitute sub-
stantial impairments in Contract Clause 
analysis. The Fourth Circuit found a 
substantial impairment when the City of 
Baltimore declared mandatory fur-
loughs during a budget crisis.94 The 
court noted that "at the very least, 
where the contract right or obligation 
impaired was one that induced the 
parties to enter into the contract and 
upon the continued existence of which 
they have especially relied, the impair-
ment must be considered 'substantial.'" 
Though the court did not adopt a 
particular minimum reduction suffi-
cient to establish that an impairment 
was "substantial,"95 it did "reject the . . . 
contention that an annual salary 
reduction of .95 percent is insubstan-
tial."96  Just as the New York Court of 
Appeals had cited the effect of the 
proposed pay lag on public employees' 
ability to pay monthly bills and provide 
for food and other necessities, the 
Fourth Circuit focused on the day-to-
day effect of the lost wages resulting 
from mandatory furloughs, noting that 
an annual salary reduction of .95 percent 
"could represent a substantial portion of 
a monthly mortgage or rental payment, 
or weeks of food," and indicating a 
reluctance to hold that "any decrease .  . . 
beyond a de minimis one could be
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considered insubstantial."97
The Fourth Circuit next determined 
that the furlough plan was  reasonable 
and necessary "in light of the magnitude 
and timing of . . . cuts in state funding, . 
. . the undisputed legitimacy of the City's 
need to balance its budget, the City's 
concerted efforts to exhaust numerous 
alternative[s],  . . . the  . . . nature of the 
furlough plan, and the City's immediate 
abandonment of the reductions at the 
first opportunity."98  This final determi-
nation has been heavily criticized, with 
some arguing that the court gave too 
much deference to the City in light of the 
principle that the impairment of public 
contracts should receive less defer-
ence.99
Several years later, in Massachusetts 
Community College Council v. Common-
wealth, the Supreme Court of Massachu-
setts  applied Contract Clause analysis 
to the declaration of legislatively-
directed furloughs.100 The Massachu-
setts Legislature's enacted legislation 
providing for furloughs "as a matter of 
paramount public policy, during this 
period of fiscal exigency."101 The legisla-
ture indicated in its findings that it 
considered furloughs "the least painful 
means" of reducing spending "while 
permitting the continuation, without 
any interruption, of the provisions of 
vital services."102  The furlough gave 
employees several options of how to 
take their furlough days, and required 
additional furlough days for employees 
earning more than $25,000.103
Applying the analysis from U.S. 
Trust, the court determined that the 
furlough program "substantially im-
paired the Commonwealth's obligation 
to pay compensation to the various 
affected employees covered by the 
collective bargaining agreements."104 
The court cited Baltimore Teachers 
Union with approval for the proposition 
that even small reductions in compensa-
tion can amount to substantial impair-
ments of collective bargaining agree-
ments.105
The Massachusetts Supreme Court
determined that the furloughs were not 
reasonable under the third part of the 
U.S. Trust analysis. Though the finan-
cial situation in Massachusetts in 1990 
was precarious and the legislature had 
legitimate concerns regarding its ability 
to balance the budget, it had already 
allocated sufficient funds to pay the 
compensation called for in its collective 
bargaining agreements with state em-
ployee unions.106 Indeed, it sought to 
declare furloughs in order to "generate 
revenue surpluses that would be 
available at the end of the fiscal year."107 
Moreover, the court determined that 
"[t]he fiscal problems . . . were 
reasonably foreseeable when the collec-
tive bargaining agreements were 
signed."108  Though the ultimate difficul-
ties proved worse than expected, "[a]ny 
difference . . .  was a difference in degree 
and not  a difference in kind," leading the 
court to declare the "substantial impair-
ment of State employees' rights under 
collective bargaining agreements can-
not be justified as reasonable."109
After Massachusetts Community, the 
fiscal crisis of the early 1990s calmed. 
Contract Clause jurisprudence with 
respect to furloughs would remain 
largely dormant until the most recent 
downturn,110  when the issue was again 
raised in Fraternal Order of Police v. 
Prince George's County, Maryland.111  In 
the wake of the housing bubble, Prince 
George's County sought to close a 
revenue gap by furloughing 5,900 
employees.112  The County was hit more 
severely than others, and had the 
highest foreclosure rate in Maryland at 
one point.113  Several unions represent-
ing the employees sued, arguing that the 
County could not abrogate the collective 
bargaining agreements in light of the 
Contract Clause.114
Applying the three-part inquiry, the 
Federal District Court for the District of 
Maryland determined that there had in 
fact been an impairment when the 
county furloughed its employees,115  and 
that the resulting 3.85 percent salary 
reduction was a significant impair-
ment.116 Turning to the issue of whether 
the impairment was "reasonable and 
necessary,"117 the court found that the 
county's actions were unreasonable 
because they sought to recoup more than 
one third of their total deficit of $57 
million from the employees, and did not 
narrowly tailor the plan to take the 
minimum amount necessary, as the City 
of Baltimore had done in Baltimore 
Teacher's Union.118 Nor were the 
furloughs a necessity: the county had 
forewarning of the downturn and had 
significant reserve funds that it could 
have drawn from to avoid impairing 
collective bargaining agreements (the 
county had chosen not to do so  to 
preserve its bond rating).119
On appeal, however, the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, 
holding that there had been no impair-
ment of the contract, since the county 
personnel laws permitted officials to 
require furloughs unless "specifically 
provided otherwise in . . . collective 
bargaining agreements."120  While the 
union had previously bargained for 
prohibitions on furloughs, no such 
prohibition appeared in the operative 
agreement.121 The Fourth Circuit rea-
soned that the furlough provisions in the 
county personnel laws were sufficiently 
narrow, and did not prevent the parties 
from entering into an otherwise "mean-
ingful and binding contract."122
B. Furlough Challenges Based 
on Due Process
The Contract Clause cannot protect 
collective bargaining agreements from 
Congressional impairment in the Dis-
trict of Columbia, since the Clause only 
applies to the states.123  In affirming "the 
expansiveness of Congress's power to 
legislate for the District," and refusing 
to recognize "any constitutional limita-
tion on that power derived from 
constitutional limitations on actions by 
states,"124 the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals determined that 
furlough days enacted through appro-
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Contract Clause review.125
In District of Columbia v. AFSCME, 
the union alternatively argued that 
Congress was limited in its ability to 
impair collective bargaining agree-
ments under the Due Process Clause in 
the Fifth Amendment.126 The trial court 
agreed that the Due Process Clause does 
limit Congress in this respect. On 
appeal, and under the rational basis 
standard, the D. C. Court of Appeals 
determined that the city's furlough plan, 
approved in Congressional appropria-
tions, was based on reasonable judg-
ments about the availability and alloca-
tion of resources, and that there had 
been no violation of the unions' due 
process rights.127
C. Analyzing Contract Clause 
Jurisprudence and Union Strategy
Challenging furloughs as unconstitu-
tional violations of the Contract Clause 
should prove a popular avenue if the 
jurisprudence continues to develop 
favorably against impairment.  A full 
survey of all public contracts impair-
ment case law published in 2007 
concluded that "[e]ven in cases of 
extreme fiscal crisis, including bank-
ruptcy, the courts have been reluctant to 
modify or repeal the provisions of 
collective bargaining agreements."128  A 
secondary benefit of the jurisprudence 
thus far is that the Contract Clause can 
be cited just as easily in New York as it 
can be in California, and against cities 
just as easily as against states or the 
federal government. Moreover, and as 
the decisions in Baltimore Teachers 
Union and Massachusetts Community 
College Council indicate, it is relatively 
easy to demonstrate a substantial 
impairment of a collective bargaining 
agreement even where the wages lost 
from mandatory furloughs are later 
reimbursed.129 Indeed, except for Balti-
more Teachers Union,130 which was 
highly criticized,  unions whose collec-
tive bargaining agreements guaranteed 
a minimum level of hours or wages had
yet to lose an impairment claim in 
furlough litigation until the reversal in 
Fraternal Order of Police.131 Now, in the 
Fourth Circuit at least, unions will have 
to be mindful of local personnel laws 
requiring specific provisions in the 
collective bargaining agreement prohib-
iting furlough plans.
The strategy to challenge furloughs is 
not without its perils, however, in that 
while reducing the compensation level 
provided  in a collective bargaining 
agreement may run afoul of the Contract 
Clause, it is also usually a more 
amenable solution for state employees 
than the elimination of staff positions 
altogether. If states and municipalities 
see a trend toward furloughs being 
struck down as unconstitutional, they 
will be less likely to declare furlough 
days and more likely to proceed directly 
to reducing staff through layoffs, as was 
the case when AFSCME sought to 
challenge unilateral furloughs in 2003,132 
as discussed in Part IV. In this analysis, 
unions should take care not to overuse 
Contract Clause suits. Unions should to 
strike a balance, whereby their employ-
ers will use furloughs to avoid layoffs 
when the financial situation is truly 
dire, but will avoid using furloughs 
when there are more ready alternatives 
that will not impact members of the 
bargaining unit. Impairment litigation 
can be seen  as a tactical option to be used 
only sparingly in directing the behavior 
of the employer.
V. Conclusion
Furloughs will likely continue to be a pop-
ular tool for state officials seeking to re-
duce expenditures in light of shrinking 
revenues while maintaining employee ex-
pertise and morale. Unions prefer fur-
loughs to layoffs because they keep mem-
bers on their rolls and offer an addition-
al bargaining chip to negotiate long-term 
job security. But mandatory unpaid fur-
loughs can anger unions when imposed 
unilaterally, and have the potential to 
generate challenges based on a variety 
of legal theories. 
      Perhaps the most widespread and
successful approach for unions thus far
has been to challenge furloughs under the 
Contract Clause of the U.S. Constitution.
 As the economic downturn proceeds into 
its third and fourth years, the litigation 
over furloughs will continue. Unions will 
win sometimes, requiring compensation 
for days never worked – and services that 
the state will never receive; and states will 
win sometimes, affecting the local 
economies which are dependent on the in-
comes of state workers. In the meantime,
 state workers and the members of the pub-
lic who rely on government services will 
continue to be caught in the crosshairs of 
uncertainty as the courts work out the lim-
its on state authority to send workers home 
without pay.
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   Developments
Recent
Recent Developments is a regular 
feature of The Illinois Public Employee 
Relations Report. It highlights recent 
legal developments of interest to the 
public employment relations commu-
nity. This issue focuses on developments 




In   Chicago Mathematics & Science 
Academy Charter School, Inc. and 
Chicago Alliance of Charter Teachers & 
Staff,  IFT,  AFT Case No. 13-RM-1768 
(NLRB RD 2010), the Region 13 Office of 
the National Labor Relations Board 
held that Chicago Math and Science 
Academy Charter School (CMSA) is 
"political subdivision of the State of 
Illinois," and therefore outside of the 
jurisdiction under the National Labor 
Relations Act.
The Regional Director dismissed a 
petition filed by CMSA seeking an 
election after the Chicago Alliance of 
Charter Teachers and Staff  filed a 
majority interest representation peti-
tion with the IELRB.
Section 2(2) of the NLRA excludes 
"any state or political subdivision 
thereof."  The Regional Director applied 
the test set forth in NLRB v. National
Gas Utility District of Hawkins County, 
Tennessee. 402 U.S. 600 (1971), which 
limits the political subdivision exemp-
tion to entities that are either (i) created 
by the state, so as to constitute 
departments or administrative arms of 
the government, or (ii) administered by 
individuals who are responsible to 
public officials or the general electorate. 
The Regional Director found that CMSA 
is "clearly a political subdivision of the 
State of Illinois under both prongs . . . 
each one by itself equally compelling."
The Regional Director found that 
CMSA was a creation of Illinois statute, 
satisfying the first prong of the Hawkins 
test. The enabling legislation for charter 
schools is the Charter Schools Law, 
1995. 105 ILCS 5/27A-1 et. seq., which 
establishes the state's intent, authorizes 
local school boards to certify a charter, 
and provides for public funding, govern-
mental oversight and accountability 
requirements.
The Regional Director emphasized 
that the Illinois General Assembly's 
declared purpose for enacting the 
Charter Schools Law was "to create a 
legitimate avenue for parents, teachers, 
and community member to take respon-
sible risks and create new, innovative, 
and more flexible ways of educating 
children  within the public school sys-
tem." (emphasis in Board opinion).
The Regional Director also found that 
the recent declaratory amendments to the 
Charter Schools Law  providing that a 
charter school shall comply with the 
IELRA and that the governing body of the 
a charter school is an "educational 
employer" subject to the IELRA, respec-
tively, further exemplified legislative 
intent that  charter schools are within the 
public school system.
The Regional Director found that the 
CMSA was accountable to Chicago 
Public Schools (CPS) for compliance 
with the charter, provisions of law and 
its finances. CMSA's Board of Directors, 
although not appointed or subject to 
removal by public officials, are nonethe-
less accountable to CPS to such an 
extent that its governing body is
responsible to the public officials or to 
the general electorate. CMSA's Board of 
Directors must submit independent 
annual financial audits, a detailed 
budget, and quarterly statements. CMSA 
receives 80 percent of its operating 
budget from CPS. CMSA's compliance 
with reporting requirements to CPS 
determines the amount of funding 
allocated to CMSA and whether its 
charter is renewed, put on probation or 
revoked by CPS. These reporting 
requirements include daily accountabil-
ity reports, academic progress over-
sight, and required teacher credentials. 
Duty to Bargain
In Thornton Fractional High School
District No. 215 v. IELRB No. 1-09-1597, 
2010 WL 3834467 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. Sept. 
30, 2010), the Illinois Appellate Court for 
the, First District reversed the IELRB’s 
determination that the District had violated 
of the IELRA. The IELRB had affirmed 
the administrative law judge's  holdings 
that that the District violated section 
14(a)(5) of the Act when it changed the 
hiring policy in the guidance office at 
Thornton Fractional South High School 
without notice or negotiation with the 
Union and sections 14(a)(3) and 14(a)(1) 
when it refused to give Carmen Mureiko 
a 12-month position as the most senior 
secretary.
Mureiko testified before the ALJ that 
she started working at Thornton South 
on June 17, 1997, and began working in 
the registrar position in 1999. In 
February of 2005, District Superinten-
dent Robert Wilhite announced that at 
the start of the 2005-06 school year, in 
an attempt to reduce a major budget deficit, 
"all 12-month building secretaries will
be reduced to 10.5 months except the
principal secretary and the senior
guidance secretary." Mureiko testified 
that Thornton South principal John
Hallberg told the secretaries at Thornton 
South that the most senior employee in 
the guidance department, Kim Nichols, 
would remain a 12-month employee.
In February  2006, certain clerical 
employees of the District met with the 
Union, decided on representation by the
127. Id. at 90-91.
128. Wenkart, supra note 80, at 19-20.
129. Baltimore Teachers Union v. Mayor and 
City Council of Baltimore, 6 F.3d 1012, 1018 n. 
8 (1993); Mass. Cmty. Coll. Council v. 
Commonwealth, 649 N.E.2d 708, 712 (1995).
130. See, e.g., Lee, supra note 99; Note, Fourth 
Circuit Upholds City's Payroll Reduction Plan 
as a Reasonable and Necessary Impairment of 
Public Contract, 107 HARV L. REV. 949 (1994). 
131. Fraternal Order of Police v. Prince 
George's County, Maryland, 608 F.3d 183 (4th 
Cir. 2010).
132.  AFSCME v. Schwartz, 343 Ill.App.3d 553, 
797 N.E.2d 1087 (2003). ‚
00472_IPER _Page 9 _ 12/8/2010 _ 12:32 PM
 IPER REPORT Fall  2010
10
When questioned about this decision 
at a bargaining meeting, the District did 
not offer an explanation other than it was 
not obliged to assign Mureiko to the position. 
Dr. Wilhite testified that he told his build-
ing principals and his assistant principal 
that he wanted the "best preson to be able 
to take care of that Guidance Office in the 
summer regardless of seniority." Waitekus 
testified there was never a practice or un-
derstanding between the Union and Dis-
trict that employees who had their hours 
cut from 12 months to 10.5 months would 
have their positions restored based on se-
niority. Waitekus also denied that Mureiko’
s participation in union activities was dis-
cussed by the District before a decision 
was made on her application and said “
she didn’t know that Ms. Mureikos even 
had anything to do with organizing the 
union until this hearing. She also denied 
telling Mureiko to be “careful what she 
wished for.”
Emilie Junge, field service director for 
the Union, testified that she asked the 
District's attorney "what the deal was" 
with Mureiko not being selected for a 12-
month assignment and that the attorney 
responded "[Mureiko will] never get it."
The Appellate Court applied a 
"clearly erroneous" standard for rever-
sal. With respect to the 14(a)(5) 
violation, the court noted that "a term or 
condition of employment must be an 
established practice in order to consti-
tute a status quo," and that whether a 
status quo exists must be determined on 
a 'case-by-case' basis" and include an 
evaluation of past history, past bargain-
ing practice, existing contract terms and 
the reasonable expectations of employ-
ees.
The court held that in this case there 
were no existing contract terms or 
written pronouncements by the District 
indicating an official policy of assigning 
the guidance department’s 12-month 
schedules based solely on senority. The 
court noted that the parties had also 
stipulated before the ALJ that the 
"Educational Support Staff Work Rules 
and Regulations" from 2002 to 2006 did 
not state that seniority controls which 
employees schedules were reduced from 
10.5 months or which employees had a 
first right to a future 12-month position.
The court also held that the evidence 
of past bargaining was insufficient to 
show the District failed to bargain in 
good faith. The court noted that despite 
Mureiko’s testimony that she received 
no answers about why she was not 
selected for the position, there was 
nothing in the record showing a 
proposal was made by the the union to 
bargain over the issue of Mureiko
Layoffs
In Chicago Teachers Union v. Board of 
Education, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 105715 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 4, 2010) the U.S. District 
Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois ordered the Board of Education 
to rescind discharges of tenured teach-
ers, and to promulgate a set of recall 
rules, following good faith negotiations 
with the Chicago Teachers Union, 
within 30 days. The court also perma-
nently enjoined the layoffs or “honorable 
discharges” until such time as the recall 
rules are promulgated.
Facing significant budget deficits 
before the 2010-2011 school year, the 
Board was forced to lay off nearly 1,300 
teachers.  The Board implemented its 
layoffs through a series of resolutions 
authorizing the "honorable termina-
tion" of tenured teachers, and  authoriz-
ing schools to first lay off teachers who 
were under remediation and whose last 
performance ratings were negative. 
However, the majority of tenured 
teachers laid off were rated "excellent," 
"superior," or "satisfactory."
Throughout the summer, the Board 
implemented layoffs of 1,289 teach-
ers. All laid-off teachers received 
notice of their termination, but 
were not provided an opportunity 
to demonstrate their qualifications
Union and selected officers. Mureiko 
was selected as vice president and 
grievance officer.
In February 2007, Mureiko addressed 
a bargaining session about the need to 
increase the hours worked by the 
clerical staff . Mureiko testified that 
District Board President Debbie 
Waitekus told her to be “careful what 
she wished for,” and superintendent 
Wilhite told her “to be careful” about her 
comments.
In May 2007, a secretarial position 
became vacant at Thornton South. The 
vacancy posting did not specify whether 
the position was a 12-month or 10.5-
month position,  but it was given to Kim 
Taylor, who was less senior than 
Mureiko by more than two years, on a 12-
month basis. Mureiko continued to be 
employed on a 10.5 month basis.
Junge also admitted that during 
negotiations the Union withdrew a 
proposal to "restore staff 12 months to 
10.5 months.
The IELRB found that the evidence 
established a "status quo" of assigning 
12-month schedules in the guidance 
department based on seniority.  The 
IELRB found that the District violated 
Section 14(a)(5) when it denied Mureiko 
a 12-month schedule despite her senior-
ity, also noting the District’s refusal to 
discuss the issue and the District’s 
attorney’s statement that Mureiko 
would “never get it.”
receiving the 12-month position. The 
court further noted that Junge testified 
consciously chose to withdraw  the 
general proposal that would have given 
Mureiko a 12-month position.
Finally, the Court held that the 
employees in the guidance office could 
not have reasonably expected seniority 
to be the determining factor in the 
selection of 12-month employees be-
cause there was no such past practice 
and, even assuming they were made, 
representations to that effect by the 
assistant principal and the assistant 
superintendent did not carry the weight 
of policy pronouncements.
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qualifications, certifications, experi-
ence, performance ratings or evalua-
tions, and . . . job performance" when 
implementing layoffs.  The Union relied 
on Mims v. Bd. of Educ., 523 F.2d 711 (7th 
Cir. 1975), which held that that plaintiffs 
had a property interest in their 
continued active employment, and that 
the board failed to establish a procedure 
for employees to obtain review of layoff 
decisions to ensure they were not for 
impermissible reasons or to demon-
strate that they should have been 
retained in some capacity.
The court agreed that, in light of Mims 
and 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31), the Board 
violated the tenured teachers' due 
process rights to some sort of retention 
procedure, because the Board failed to 
promulgate rules to govern layoffs 
which were contemplated by Section 5/ 
34-18(31).  Although the court admitted 
that the statute's statement that the 
Board "shall have the power" to 
promulgate rules is "ambiguous," it 
noted when the Board passed its 
resolution to consider performance 
ratings and evaluations when making 
layoff decisions, the Board explained 
that this rule was "require[d]" by Section 
5/34-18(31). The court concluded that 
Section 5/34-18(31) provides tenured 
teachers some residual property rights 
in the event of an economic layoff.
for retention in some capacity.
The Union argued that tenured 
teachers, laid off for economic reasons, 
had a due process right to some type of 
retention procedure before they were 
permanently discharged. The Court 
stated that to prevail on a claim for the 
deprivation of property without due 
process, a plaintiff must establish that 
she holds a property interest protected 
by the Fourteenth Amendment.  How-
ever, such property interests are not 
formed by the Constitution, but are 
created by existing rules, such as state 
law.
The Union located the property 
interest in 105 ILCS 5/34-18(31), which 
requires the Board to consider teachers'
However, the court stated that normally 
state law rules and regulations create 
the property interest whereas here 
there were "no rules, only the statutory 
authorization/requirement for rules un-
der 5/34-18(31)[, and] [w]ithout rules or 
regulations, the court can do no more 
than read 5/34-18(31) as vaguely provid-
ing a property interest in some sort of 
retention procedure."  The court added, 
"Because the court lacks institutional 
competence to draft the missing rules 
and regulations," the Board must 
compile a set of rules in consultation 
with the Union which abides by Section 
5/34-18(31).
IPLRA Developments
In  Illinois Council of Police v. ILRB, 
Local Panel, No. 1-09-1859 and 1-09-
1860, 2010 WL 3834596 (Ill.App. 1st Dist. 
Sept. 30, 2010) the First District 
Appellate Court affirmed the Local 
Panel’s certification of a new, stand-
alone bargaining unit  of aviation 
security sergeants.  This decision 
partially overturned Illinois Council of 
Police & Sheriffs, Local 7, 18 PERI § -01-
010 (ILRB Local Panel 2002), where the 
Board found that the aviation security 
sergeants were not peace officers under 
the IPLRA and a stand-alone bargaining 
unit for the sergeants was not appropri-
ate.
The City aruged that the only 
appropriate bargaining unit for the 
sergeants would be a preexisting Unit II 
which included other aviation security 
employees because the stand-alone unit 
would create fragmentation.
In affirming the ILRA’s decision, the 
court examined the Board's departure 
from its long standing-preference for 
large, broad functionally based bargain-
ing units and recent precedent in 
certifying small, stand-alone units.  The 
court stated that an agency may adjust 
its standards and policies in light of 
experience, as long as the adjustments 
are not arbitrary and capricious.  The 
court analyzed three recent Board
certifications of smaller units, and 
determined that this departure was 
"anything but arbitrary and capricious." 
See International Brotherhood of Team-
sters, 23 PERI ¶ 172, (ILRB Local Panel, 
(2007) (Board certified unit of 23 
supervising police communications op-
erators); State v. ILRB, 388 Ill. App. 3d 
319, 902 N.E.2d 1122 (2009) (affirming 
decision of the Board in Illinois Nurses 
Ass'n, 23 PERI 173 (ILRB State Panel, 
2007) (certifying a unit of six Bureau of 
Administrative Litigation staff attor-
neys), City of Chicago v. ILRB,  396 Ill. 
App. 3d  61, 918 N.E. 2d 1103 (2009) 
(affirming Board decision certifying 
unit of 34 public health nurses).
The Board has held that the fragmen-
tation factor by itself was insufficient to 
deny a petition seeking unit certifica-
tion for a small subset of employees who 
had never been represented.  In 
International Brotherhood of Teamsters 
the Board explained, that "although the 
preference for large functionally-based 
unit was, and continues to be, an 
important consideration, . . . excessive 
concern with avoiding fragmentation 
and promoting economy and efficiency 
in public bargaining and contract 
administration consumed not only the 
employee's right to organize, but also 
the criteria set forth in section 9(b)."  The 
court found this reason more than 
adequate to show that the shift in 
certifying smaller units was well 
considered and reasonable.  Thus, given 
the shift in Board policy to certify 
smaller units, it was not clearly 
erroneous for the Board to certify this 
bargaining unit though it had denied 
certification of the same unit in 2002.‚
00472_IPER _Page 11 _ 12/8/2010 _ 12:32 PM
 IPER REPORT Fall  2010
12
The Report Subscription Form (Volume 27, Numbers 1-4)
The publication of The Illinois Public Employee Relations Report reflects a continuing effort by IIT Chicago-Kent College 
of Law and The University of Illinois School of Labor and Employment Relations to provide education services to labor 
relations professionals in Illinois. The Report is available by subscription through Chicago-Kent College of Law at a rate 
of $40.00 per calendar year for four issues. To subscribe to IPER Report, please complete this form and return it with a 
check or billing instructions to:
Institute for Law and the Workplace 
Chicago-Kent College of Law
Illinois Institute of Technology 
565 W. Adams Street 




Address (Please give address where the IPER Report should be mailed.)
The Illinois Public Employee Relations Report provides current, nonadversarial information to those involved or 
interested in employer-employee relations in public employment. The authors of bylined articles are responsible for 
the contents and for the opinions and conclusions expressed. Readers are encouraged to submit comments on the 
contents, and to contribute information on developments in public agencies or public-sector labor relations. The 
Illinois Institute of Technology and University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign are affirmative action/equal 
opportunitiesinstitutions.
 Illinois Public Employee Relations Report . . .
Published quarterly by The University of Illinois School of Labor and Employment 
Relations at Urbana-Champaign and IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law llinois Institute 
of Technology,  (ISSN 1559-9892), 565 West Adams Street, Chicago, Illinois  60661-3691.
Faculty Editors:                           Student Editors:
Peter Feuille and Martin Malin               Margaret Bogacki, Thaddeus H. Goodchild, 
Production Editor:                              Deena Anne Sanceda and Megan A. Wagner 
Sharon Wyatt-Jordan
Please start my subscription to IPER Report.
Please bill me.
We also accept MasterCard, VISA and Discover Card;
Please complete the following information:








Enclosed is my check payable to Chicago-Kent College of Law.






00472_IPER _Page 12 _ 12/8/2010 _ 12:32 PM
